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Summary 
 
This report addresses the under-studied area of the role of the top management team and 
board of directors in the development of academic spin-off companies originating from 
universities and public research institutes.  
 
The questions addressed are as follows: 
• What are the distinctive team and board characteristics associated with successful 
academic spin-offs and what we can learn from this? (Section 5). 
• How can public government programs that aim to stimulate academic spin-off 
formation be designed, in order to take into account the important aspects of 
human capital in these firms? (Section 6).  
 
The findings show that boards in successful academic spin-off firms add value by bringing in 
necessary resources that the management team lacks. Additions of outside directors to the 
board are associated with a positive firm development. Larger and more active networking 
boards facilitate the recruitment of new people to the top management team. The board chair’s 
personal networks are important when finding new potential board members. Effective teams 
have members with diverse functional experience and industrial backgrounds. This diversity 
is associated with the firm’s ability to recruit new members to the management team and 
attract venture capital financing. The probability of attracting venture capital financing is also 
higher when an academic spin-off has previously received seed and industry capital financing. 
 
We recommend that policy makers develop policies that support the needs of academic spin-
off firms to find professional outside directors. We also recommend that seed funds could 
make more investments in academic spin-offs and that more industrial schemes could be 
designed to stimulate greater involvement of industrial actors in academic spin-offs.
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Sammendrag  
 
Denne rapporten utforsker hvilken rolle ledelse og styre spiller i utviklingen av akademiske 
spin-off bedrifter. 
 
Rapporten prøver å besvare følgende spørsmål: 
• Hva kjennetegner lederteamet og styret i suksessrike spin-off bedrifter og hva vi 
kan lære av dette (kapittel 5); 
• Hvordan offentlige program rettet mot å fremme spin-off etableringer kan 
utformes mht det å ha en riktig human kapital som bidrar til vekst i bedrifter 
(kapittel 6).  
 
Funnene viser at i suksessfulle akademiske spin-off bedrifter tilfører nøkkelpersoner i styret 
ressurser som lederteamet mangler og som varierer fra finansiell og industriell erfaring i 
tidligere faser til ledelses og markedsføring / salgs erfaring i senere utviklingsfaser. Slik 
hjelper eksterne styremedlemmer bedriften til å styrke sin levedyktighet og nærme seg da 
neste fase hvor avkastningen gjerne stabiliserer seg. Styrets størrelse og nettverksbygging 
fremgår som viktige faktorer når det gjelder det å rekruttere nye medlemmer til lederteamet 
med nødvendig kompetanse som åpner opp for nye vekstmuligheter. Akademiske spin-off 
bedrifter som har bidragsytende styre og lederteammedlemmer med variert funksjonell og 
industriell bakgrunn lykkes med å rekruttere nye teammedlemmer og anskaffe venture kapital. 
Samtidig øker sannsynligheten for å skaffe venture kapital hvis spin-off bedriften tidligere har 
lyktes med å skaffe finansiell støtte fra såkornfond og industrielle partnere. 
 
Våre anbefalinger for aktører og program som støtter akademiske spin-off bedrifter er å 
imøtekomme disse bedriftenes behov for å finne profesjonelle eksterne styremedlemmer. Vi 
anbefaler også at såkornfond går inn i flere akademiske spin-off bedrifter og flere industrielle 
program kunne vært utviklet for å stimulere at industrielle aktører engasjerer seg i akademiske 
spin-off bedrifter i større grad.  
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1 Introduction 
This report relates to the development of academic spin-off firms.  Academic spin-offs are 
technology-based firms founded by employees from a university or research institute, around 
a technology which has initially been developed at the university or research institute (Birley 
2002). Studies on the creation of new firms from universities comprise a rapidly growing 
research area (Shane 2004; Wright et al. 2007). This rising research interest reflects the 
increases in commercial activity and spin-off formation taking place in the majority of 
universities (Lockett et al. 2005). Governments increasingly recognise that academic spin-offs 
are important generators of national growth and societal development (O’Shea et al. 2004; 
Wright et al. 2004; Lindholm-Dahlstrand and Klofsten 2002) and therefore direct more 
support to stimulate the process of technological transfer with the aim of spawning more high-
growth, technology-based firms from university research. 
   
In 2003, Norway made a legislative change, which is similar to the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act in 
the US, implying that researchers no longer hold intellectual property rights to their 
inventions (Rasmussen et al. 2006a). Since this change, the universities own these rights and 
following from this, technology transfer offices (TTO) have been established in order to 
commercialize and manage these rights. There are several programs and actors that support 
Norwegian start-ups which try to commercialize research-based business ideas (Rasmussen et 
al. 2007; Borlaug et al. 2009). For instance, the FORNY program (which works indirectly 
through TTOs) deals with pre-startup academic spin-offs during the research and opportunity 
framing stages. The program has funds for idea generation, commercialization, proof of 
concept, and leave of absence allowing academics to work on ideas and test their concepts on 
a full-time basis.  Government agency Innovation Norway lends financial and managerial 
support to the founders of the ventures with growth potential, including academic spin-offs, 
which have been legally established. In later post-startup stages, when the technology is 
verified and the venture has proved its viability, a spin-off may apply for a public and 
industrial R&D contract grant (“IFU/OFU”). By having this scheme, Innovation Norway 
stimulates spin-off companies to cooperate with the public sector (e.g. hospitals, the 
Norwegian Armed Forces) and industry.  
 
As with studies in other countries, most spin-off studies in Norway primarily investigated 
government and university initiatives to promote and support commercialization of academic 
research (e.g. Rasmussen et al. 2006b; Rasmussen and Sørheim 2006).   Few studies examine 
the founding team demonstrating that it evolves in to a top management team and board 
during legal incorporation and that the team heterogeneity has significant consequences for 
firm performance (Ensley and Hmieleski 2005; Vanaelst et al. 2006). Academic spin-off 
ventures are typically founded by entrepreneurial teams (Roberts 1991; Shane 2004). Such 
teams can play a significant role in facilitating business development and superior business 
performance, when compared to spin offs started by individuals (Roure and Maidique, 1986; 
Kamm et al., 1990) because a venture led by a team will generally be broader and more 
diverse in terms of human capital, than a venture led by a solo entrepreneur. Even fewer 
studies investigate the role of boards in academic spin-offs (e.g. Clarysse et al. 2007). This is 
surprising as well-networked outside directors may contribute to spin-off development, by 
increasing a firm’s legitimacy and thus reducing liabilities of newness as well as providing 
access to critical external resources that young academic spin-offs need to survive (Pfeffer 
and Salancik 1978; Selznick 1949; Lynall et al. 2003).  
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This report sheds light on the role of the top management team and board in academic spin-
off development. The questions addressed are as follows: 
 
• What are the distinctive team and board characteristics associated with 
successful academic spin-offs and what can we learn from this? 
• How can public government programs that aim to stimulate academic spin-off 
formation be designed, in order to take into account the important aspects of 
human capital in these firms?  
 
In this report I draw heavily on the materials and results from my dissertation (Bjørnåli 2009) 
and published articles which are included in this dissertation. However, this report brings 
additional insights regarding the roles of teams and boards role in spin-off ventures. 
Additional descriptive statistics on Norwegian academic spin-offs are presented (in section 4), 
supplemental correlation analysis has been conducted, and the questions listed above are 
addressed.  
 
The structure of the report is as follows: the theoretical framework and the main concepts 
used are presented in section 2. Section 3 describes methods and data collection including the 
preliminary qualitative studies, the survey, and key measures. The characteristics of the 
respondent-firms and their teams and boards are described in section 4. Chapters 5 and 6 
address this report’s two key questions in turn; and, finally conclusions are set out.  
 
 
2 Theoretical framework 
2.1 Academic spin-off development 
Drawing on stage-based and life-cycle literature, an academic spin-off is seen as a threshold 
firm undergoing transitions and moving from one development stage to the next (Kazanjian 
1988; Vohora et al. 2004). To progress to the subsequent stage a spin-off venture has to 
overcome the thresholds it faces. This process is characterized as iterative and non-linear with 
setbacks and steps forward. Therefore, the successful spin-off development is, rather than by 
sales and profit, defined by whether the venture has overcome certain thresholds and achieved 
important entrepreneurial milestones. For instance, attracting external finance, e.g. venture 
capital, is a key constraint on the development of academic spin-off firms (Wright et al. 
2006). Thus, having achieved venture capital financing may be seen as an important 
entrepreneurial milestone marking a spin-off’s success. 
 
The academic spin-off development process is illustrated in Fig.2.1. One of the most 
important entrepreneurial events is the legal establishment of the company (see Fig. 2.1). 
According to Vohora et al. (2004), after legal incorporation an academic spin-off needs to 
overcome two main critical thresholds if it is to succeed: credibility and sustainability. The 
credibility threshold is a lack of credibility that constraints the academic entrepreneur’s ability 
to access and acquire seed finance and human capital to develop the entrepreneurial team 
(ibid). By overcoming the credibility threshold the venture reaches a Proof-of-Viability stage 
characterized by proving the viability of the venture, having a team and necessary initial 
resources to develop business. The ability to continuously re-configure existing resources, 
capabilities and social capital with new information, knowledge and resources is required to 
overcome the threshold of sustainability (ibid). Having overcome the sustainability threshold 
means reaching the last, sustainable returns or Maturity stage, in which the company’s 
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credibility outside the scientific community is increased and sufficient returns from business 
activities are achieved. 
Figure 2.1   Academic spin-off development: stages 
 
2.2 The top management team and board of directors 
A top management team is defined as a group of people who are responsible for managing an 
academic spin-off and making key strategic decisions related to spin-off development. Similar 
to academic spin-off development, an academic spin-off team is also a dynamic concept. 
Recent studies that build on stage-based models demonstrate that during legal incorporation 
of the firm the top management and board of directors are formed (Vanaelst et al. 2006; 
Filatotchev et al. 2006). The founding team that has led an ASO through the research stage 
splits into the top management team and board during the legal establishment of the firm. The 
founding team members become members of the management team, board or both. For 
instance, academic founders and surrogate entrepreneurs introduced from outside academia 
(Franklin et al. 2001) may become part of both the TMT and board (Vanaelst et al. 2006). 
Other people who help academic founders in the pre-startup stage, such as TTO officers, 
become board members (Vanaelst et al. 2006; Filatotchev et al. 2006). Thus, the management 
team and board of directors can overlap (see Fig. 2.2).  Figure 2.2. illustrates the process of 
team and board formation and development. 
 
A concept of academic spin-off development adds to the complexity of team and board 
concepts. As a spin-off develops and reaches growth and maturity, the changes in 
management and governance structure occur (Vohora et al. 2004; Vanaelst et al. 2006; 
Filatotchev et al. 2006). That is new members may be introduced to the team and/or board. 
Some members may shift their positions from being a top manager to becoming a board 
member or leave the organization. This implies that as the firm develops the management 
team and board may become less overlapped and even completely separated as depicted in 
Fig. 2.2.   
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Figure 2.2 Top management team (TMT), board and academic spin-off development 
 
Thus, the board in academic spin-offs is shown to be an important component of the 
management of academic spin-offs. Along with the top management team, the board 
represents a crucial factor, which may affect academic spin-off development by influencing 
firms’ strategic decisions and future directions. Due to the overlap of the team and board and 
an active involvement of outside directors in academic spin-offs, the majority of which are 
early stage companies, this report focuses on both the top management team and the board of 
directors.  
 
 
3 Methods and data collection 
3.1 Preliminary interviews and case studies 
First, I carried out several interviews with the people involved in technology transfer and 
commercialization processes. These people were from such support organizations as (i) 
Innovation Norway (local office in Trondheim) which grants incubator and other stipends to 
entrepreneurial firms, (ii) technology transfer office NTNU TTO established in 2004, one 
year after Norway had made the Bayh-Dole Act-like legislative change, (iii) 
commercialization organization Leiv Eriksson Nyskapning which has existed long before 
NTNU TTO was established and fulfilled similar functions of facilitating commercialization 
and spin-off activity from research institutes in Trondheim, (iv) TTO Campus Kjeller in 
Lillestrøm, and (v) the FORNY program, a unit under the Research Council of Norway, 
which is in charge of stimulating commercialization of research results nationally. I also 
interviewed a couple of academic founders with long experience of commercializing their 
research, asking them about the challenges they met during their start-up efforts. Many of the 
problems emphasized by practitioners were particularly related to the management in 
academic spin-offs. 
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Then, I proceeded to the case studies given limited prior research on boards and management 
teams in academic spin-offs. The cases are described in details in an appendix to this report. It 
was important to sample firms, which were in different development stages, to better capture 
the dynamic aspects of board and team development during a firm’s life cycle. Occurrence of 
at least one board/team change (new person added, not merely role change) is a “must” case 
choice criterion. Another important criterion is the enduring involvement of the scientist-
entrepreneur or externally introduced entrepreneur occupying a key position in the firm, e.g. 
chief executive officer (CEO), chief technology officer or board chair. Such a person who has 
taken the venture through the founding process and is aware of the current operations of the 
company is expected to provide more detailed and relatively accurate descriptions related to 
board/team formation and evolution compared to other employees. 
 
In all cases there was a steady growth in the amount of employees in all cases. The cases 
represent different industries, including biotechnology, semiconductors, ICT, food, and fibre 
optics. Each of the venture’s core technology (or medicine, drug) is characterized as 
internationally new. All ventures except ICT spin-off have patented their core technology in 
and outside their country. The case ventures come from five different Norwegian research 
institutions and three US universities. Academic spin-offs may be seen as fairly common in 
the US and Norway, but the surrounding networks and support structure (e.g. supply of 
venture capital) vary widely.  Data were collected through in-depth face-to-face interviews 
conducted late in 2006 in Norway and early in 2007 in the US. In addition, I used several 
databases that contain accounting data and information on the board and top management. 
The anonymity for companies and informants was assured.  
 
3.2 Survey 
Preliminary interviews and multiple case studies have given some basic insights into the 
academic spin-off phenomenon. These insights were useful when designing the questionnaire. 
I have been able to identify 353 companies considered as originated from Norwegian 
universities and public research institutes. There are 318 companies registered as having used 
the university TTO or technology licensing-like organizations in the FORNY database. The 
rest of the companies were found through web searches. Amongst the companies, 53 reported 
that they were not ASOs or were no longer active. Hence, after drop outs the sample consisted 
of 300 spin-offs. The questionnaire was sent to the CEOs of these ASOs in autumn 2008. 
Anonymity for all companies and informants was assured. After two to-three rounds of 
personal phone calls to the CEOs, 135 academic spin-off companies returned their 
questionnaires resulting in a response rate of 45 %.  
 
Due to an active involvement of the Research Council of Norway in facilitating the creation 
of spin-off companies through the FORNY program there have for about fifteen years been 
attempts to trace and register all academic spin-offs in the database. This population consists 
of the spin-off companies created since 1995 (or earlier if it was possible to identify) which 
involves academic researchers, university technology or both, which all fit the definition of an 
academic spin-off adopted in this study. As less than ten percent of the start-ups that fit the 
definition were identified through other sources than the FORNY database, I assume that the 
characteristics of the sample are comparable to those of the whole population of academic 
spin-off companies in Norway. Hence, the sample in this study is believed to be 
representative of the entire population of academic spin-offs.  
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The survival bias is somewhat reduced since the cases represent the whole range of 
development stages, from the very early stages to maturity and decline stages. The cases in 
early (research) and decline stages amount to 4.4 % of the sample. Also, non-response bias 
was tested by comparing two different samples drawn from the same population. The sample 
of the non-respondents was drawn from the FORNY database. I tested non-response bias 
using three characteristics. The data was available on the amount of employees, firm age and 
operating revenues in 2007 for 82 firms that responded and for 137 non-respondents. Mean 
values and tests for differences in mean values between respondents and non-respondents can 
be found in the Table 3.1. The responding firms had on average three employees while non-
responding firms had four employees. The average age of responding and non-responding 
firms was approximately the same.  Operating revenues are lower in respondent firms. Our 
sample seems to be somewhat biased towards the smaller firms. However, no statistically 
significant differences are found, which indicates that non-response bias is not a problem. 
 
Table 3.1 Means, standard deviations and tests for differences in means between the responding firms and 
those not responding to the survey 
 
 
Characteristics 
 
 
Respondents 
 
Non-respondents 
 
T-statistic 
Sample size  
 
82 137 n/a 
Number of employees 
 
3.38 
(s.d. 5.16) 
 
4.31 
(s.d. 21.36) 
.390 
Firm age 
(in years) 
5.71 
(s.d. 3.23) 
 
5.92 
(s.d. 3.43) 
.448 
Operating revenues 
(in Norwegian Kroner) 
2 939 047 
(s.d. 4 507 240) 
5 366 294 
(s.d. 2.740E7) 
 
.795 
 
Notes: s.d. standard deviation  
 
3.3 Summary of the data and methods 
The data sources and methods used in this report are summarized in Table 3.2. The under-
studied topic of board dynamics in academic spin-offs is addressed by employing a multiple 
case inductive research design, that provides us with rich empirical and theoretical insights 
(article 1). The characteristics associated with boards that are active in recruiting new team 
members in spin-offs are analyzed by using logistic regression (article 2). Firm characteristics 
associated with successful venture capital acquisitions in spin-offs are tested with hierarchical 
logistic regression on the financial, team and board levels (article 3). Other results in the 
report are analysed through descriptive statistics and correlations at the strictest level of 
significance (.01). This stringent criterion implies that we can say with 99% probability that 
the (hypothesized) relationship in the population is there.   
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Table 3.2 Summary of methods used in the dissertation studies 
 
Articles Data  Method 
1. Exploring board formation and 
evolution of board composition in 
academic spin-offs (Bjørnåli & 
Gulbrandsen 2010) 
 
Case data on 11 academic spin-offs.  
Secondary data: databases and 
extensive web searches 
Multiple case 
inductive study 
2. Board features associated with 
new team member addition in 
academic spin-offs (Bjørnåli & 
Erikson 2010) 
Survey data on 135 academic spin-off 
companies 
Logistic regression 
analysis 
3. Design characteristics associated 
with venture capital acquisitions in 
academic spin-offs (Bjørnåli, 
Sørheim & Erikson 2010) 
Survey data on 135 academic spin-off 
companies  
Hierarchical logistic 
regression analysis 
Other results in this report Cases and survey data Correlation analysis, 
descriptive statistics 
 
3.4 Measuring the success of spin-off firms 
The performance of a firm is often measured by sales revenues and profits for the past three 
years. Our sample ranges from early start-ups to more mature ASOs. Many of these firms 
have no sales or profit, so these traditional measures are not appropriate.  
 
In article 1 (Bjørnåli and Gulbrandsen 2010), we measure a firm’s success in terms of whether 
it has overcome the thresholds of credibility and/or sustainability and thus reached the next 
development stage (see Fig. 2.1). In article 2 (Bjørnåli and Erikson 2010), we use an all-
subjective measure on how the company has been developing since its foundation (Fredriksen 
and Klofsten 1999). More specifically, we measure firm performance based on asking firms to 
estimate various performance variables and give each a rating of between 1 (much worse) and 
7 (much better). These variables include: growth in sales, growth in market share, profitability 
and financing since the firm’s foundation, the quality of the firm’s product/service, innovation 
in the form of new products/services and customer satisfaction since the firm’s foundation. 
We have also asked about the degree to which the firm is satisfied with its market share, 
profit, sales and return on assets.   In article 3 (Bjørnåli et al. 2010), we find that academic 
spin-offs are facing venture capital constraint; although it is challenging to obtain such 
funding, risk capital from venture capitalists appears to be a important source of funds for 
academic spin-offs, and a potential catalyst for these spin offs’ growth (Wright et al. 2006). 
Therefore in article 3 spin-off performance is measured in terms of success in attracting 
venture capital, or not.   
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4 Descriptive statistics 
4.1 Respondent firms’ characteristics 
Firm size, as measured by the number of full time equivalents (FTE), varied across the  
sampled firms: in 2008 this ranged from 0 to 35. However, for the majority of the firms the 
FTE range in 2008 was between 0 and 12. The ages of the firms varied from 1 to 24 years. 
The average firm age is 7.7 years.  
 
As for the life cycle stages, most of the firms were in the development, introduction and 
growth phase. Few firms (n = 10) were in the maturity stage. Even fewer firms reported that 
they were in a very early stage (n = 4) or in a declining/no activity stage (n = 4). The early 
stage was operationalized as following: a stage when the firm evaluates its commercial 
potential and strengthens its intellectual property rights, applies for patent or tries to protect 
the technology which will underlie its future product/service. The operationalization of other 
stages and the distribution of these stages are presented in Table 4.1.  
 
Table 4.1 Firm life cycle stages 
Firm life cycle stages Frequency
Early stage: We evaluate the commercial potential and strengthen intellectual rights; we apply for a 
patent or try to protect technology which will be at the core of our product/service. 4
Development stage: We are developing a product/service, which to limited degree is introduced in 
the market. Revenues are very low. 38
Establishment / Introduction stage: Our product/service is gradually being introduced in the 
market. 43
Growth stage: firm grows fast and investments may be necessary for further development. Our 
product/service can be introduced in several markets, and the sales are increasing. 35
Maturity stage: The sales are flattening out. Our firm has reached all potential customers in the 
targeted markets. 10
Decline or no activity 4
Total 134
 
Most of the firms reported that they were highly innovative. That is, most of the firms (n = 
108) reported that the product/service or technology they were developing or the market they 
were aiming at was completely new (see Table 4.2). The rest of the firms (n = 26) answered 
that a similar product/service, technology or market exists. Most of the firms has a 
product/service, technology or market that was also new internationally (n = 92). Only 14 
firms had a product/service, technology or market that was only new in the firm’s country or 
locally. 
 
Table 4.2 Innovation degree and scope 
Frequency
New product/service, technology, or market 
108
Similar product/service, technology, market exist 26
New product (service, technology, market) internationally 92
New product (service, technology, market) in firm country 14
 
The firms represent a broad range of industries such as ICT and health, oil and gas, energy 
and environment, medical and biotechnology and maritime and offshore, amongst others. As 
we can see from Fig. 4.1, firms in oil and gas and ICT and health industries are more or less 
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equally distributed across the development, introduction and growth stages. Most of the firms 
in the biotech-related and energy and environment industries are in the development stage. 
Most of the firms in maritime and marine-related industries are in the growth stage. Firms in 
other industries are mostly in the introduction stage. Many firms in other industries are 
consulting firms, but this group also contains those facilitating R&D and operating in finance, 
education, automation, industrial and ergonomics design industries. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Industry of the firms distributed across the various stages  
 
In total, 64 firms report that they originate from NTNU and SINTEF. The rest of the spin-off 
firms come from other Norwegian universities and public research institutes, as presented in 
Table 4.3. The history of the commercialization and establishment of technology transfer 
office at NTNU is thoroughly described in Spilling et al. (2006). More information about 
other TTOs can be found in Rasmussen et al. (2007) and Borlaug et al. (2009).  
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Table 4.3 Parent organization 
Parent organization Number of spin-offs 
NTNU: Norwegian University of science and Technology 50 
The SINTEF Group 14 
UiO: University of Oslo 11 
UMB: Norwegian University of Life Sciences 10 
University colleges 8 
UiT: University of Tromsø 8 
Research Institutes and centers 7 
IRIS: International Research Institute of Stavanger 5 
FFI: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment 4 
UiB: University of Bergen 4 
UiA: University of Agder 3 
IFE: Institute for Energy Technology 3 
UiS: University of Stavanger 1 
  
 
Most of the NTNU/SINTEF spin-offs operate in oil and gas and ICT-related industries, which 
may reflect the strong academic quality and spin-off establishment practices in their 
respective faculties/departments at NTNU and SINTEF (see Fig. 4.2). 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Industry of the spin-offs from NTNU and SINTEF compared to other spin-offs 
 
We asked the firms whether they have been situated in a university incubator or 
research/science parks; 54 firms (40%) have been situated in university incubators; 27 firms 
(20%) have been based in research/science parks. 
  
The type of financing for the firms is presented in Table 4.4. About one-fifth of all firms have 
private financing (from family). Nearly a quarter (24%) of firms have received seed financing, 
while 14% have tried, but failed, to receive seed financing. Incubator stipends have been 
  Industry 
1 Oil and gas 
2 
ICT, ICT and 
health 
3 
Medtech and 
biomedicine, 
biotech, food
4 
Maritime and 
offshore, 
marine and 
aquaculture 
5 
Energy and 
environment 
6 Other 
7 Consulting 
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received by 43% of firms. Another 40% of firms were financed through a public or industrial 
R&D grant (“IFU/OFU”). Many firms (63%) have received a range of other types of financial 
support. Among other types of support there is “Skattefunn”, a programme for supporting 
R&D investments and financial support from Innovation Norway, the European Union or 
customers.  
 
As for external private equity financing, 76 firms were financed by private investors (see 
Table 4.4). Industrial investors financed 45 spin-offs. Being financed by industrial investors is 
strongly correlated with R&D grants “IFU/OFU”, demonstrating that these types of financing 
are closely related to each other. Venture capital has been received by 37 spin-offs. 
  
Table 4.4 Have the firm contacted and ever received external financing from the following actors? 
  
No, has not tried 
(%) 
Has tried, but has 
not received (%) 
Has received 
financing (%) 
 
Family 80 0 20 100%
Seed fund 62 14 24 100%
Incubator stipend 53 5 43 100%
R&D ”IFU/OFU” grant 52 8 41 100%
Other support 34 3 63 100%
Private investors 76 firms (56%)
Industrial partners 45 firms (33%)
Venture capitalists 37 firms (27%)
 
The firms were also asked to identify their largest owner, as the original founder, an 
externally hired CEO, a venture capital investor, an industrial partner, a TTO, their employees 
or other external owners. In 53 spin-offs an external party is the largest owner, the external 
party being either venture capital investors (in 16 firms), industrial partners (in 10 firms), 
TTOs (9 firms), or other unspecified external owners (15 firms). The original founder is the 
principal owner in 43 firms. In 34 of the spin-offs an externally hired CEO is the largest 
owner.  
 
In cases when investors have financed a spin-off, we asked whether somebody from the spin-
off firm had a previous relationship with this investor. In 61 firms (42%) the board chair or 
external board member had a previous relationship with the investor. In 28% of firms the 
CEO had a previous relationship with the investor. In 8% of firms team members were the 
source of that investor relationship and only in 2 % of firms (3 spin-offs) had previous 
relationship an investor through TTOs.  
 
4.2 Characteristics of the management team and board 
Management team size varies from 0 to 9 persons, with an average team size of 2.62 team 
members. Board size varies from 1 to 7 with an average board size of 3.80 board members. 
 
In terms of the composition of the board, 42 firms (32%) do not have any academics 
(professors, researchers, PhD students) on their teams (see Table 4.5), while 37 firms (or 
28%) have just one academic. The rest of the companies have two or more academics on their 
top management teams. Twenty firms reported that they have students on the team who are 
taking, or have taken, a master degree. Eight firms involve TTO representatives in the team. 
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Table 4.5 Number of academics on the team 
 
Number of academics on the 
team Frequency % 
0 42 32 
1 37 28 
2 23 17 
3 17 13 
4 8 6 
5 - 8 5 4 
  132 100 
 
The distribution of FTEs spent on the spin-offs by academics is shown in Table 4.6. In 23 
firms academics account for less than one FTE. In the rest of the firms one or more FTEs are 
accounted for by academics. 
 
Table 4.6 Full-time equivalents of employed academics 
 
FTE Frequency % 
< 1 23 27 
1 25 30 
2 16 19 
3 12 14 
4 - 8 9 11 
 85 100 
 
 
In 62 firms the original founder is the CEO. In 12 firms the original founder is a board chair. 
In eight firms the original founder is a R&D director. In other firms the original founder has 
an additional role of some sort, such as board member, technical director or consultant. In 63 
firms the board chair represents the main owner in the firm. In 26 firms the board chair is also 
the CEO of the firm.  
We have registered 75 membership changes in the management team and/or board (see Table 
4.7). Of these, 71 changes are associated with the member leaving the team and/or board, 
while 63 changes are the arrival of a new member to the team and/or board. 
 
Table 4.7 The number and nature of team membership changes  
 
 Frequency 
The number of firms experienced one or more changes 75 
The number of team member departures 71 
The number of team member additions 63 
 
The characteristics of the academic spin-offs in our sample are summarised below. Most of 
the academic spin-offs are highly innovative, developing a product/service or a technology 
which is new internationally, or even developing completely new market. Almost half of the 
spin-offs originate from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) and 
the research institute SINTEF in Trondheim. Amongst our academic spin-offs, 40% have 
stayed in a university incubator.  A quarter of the spin-offs have received seed financing while 
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about half of the firms (56%) have been financed by private investors. About a third of the 
spin-offs have been financed by industrial partners and another third by venture capitalists. 
The team and board sizes are generally quite small: on average they have 2.6 members on the 
management team and 3.8 members on the board. Two-third of the firms involve one or more 
academics on their top management teams, who spend one or more full-time equivalent 
working with the firm. About half of all firms have experienced membership changes on the 
team/board, where members have left or joined the team/board. 
 
 
5 Distinctive team and board characteristics associated with 
successful academic spin-offs 
This section starts with a discussion of the results of the correlation analysis, which was 
carried out for the purposes of this report. As a result of this correlation analysis, several 
significant correlations between team/board variables and firm performance measures have 
been identified, and are discussed below. After this other distinctive characteristics associated 
with successful academic spin-offs are summarised, based on the findings from my 
dissertation. These distinctive characteristics are related to the board’s value-adding role, 
networking, financing and team/board membership changes. These discussions are 
supplemented by the results of the correlation analysis.   
 
5.1 Firm performance and team characteristics 
In firms that develop a completely new technology management teams tend to have diverse 
management experience and a range of industrial backgrounds. In firms that have a 
product/technology similar to those already in the market, team members have more similar 
industrial backgrounds and boards have fewer external members (those who are not firm 
employees).  
 
The longer the tenure of a CEO or team, the more satisfied firms are with their performance in 
terms of profits, sales, returns on assets, profitability, financing and the size of their market 
share (for example, this includes cases where a CEO has long been involved in the firm and 
team members have worked together many years). 
 
The presence of the original founder in the firm also influences several of the performance 
measures: sales, market share, profitability, and profit. However, the correlation analysis 
cannot give us information about the degree of the founder’s involvement (part-time or full 
time), or show if the founder’s presence has a positive or negative effect on firm performance.  
Firms with teams that are more diverse in their functional and industrial backgrounds or their 
management experience tend to be more innovative. 
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5.2 Firm performance and board characteristics 
Similarly to the finding above regarding CEO tenure, firms with a board chair with a long 
tenure tend to be more satisfied with their sales. The firms that have satisfied customers often 
have a board chair who has extensive insight into the firm’s activities and also a trustful 
leadership style.  
 
Spin-offs that highly rate their innovation, in terms of the new products/services that they 
develop, tend to be those whose board chair has: (1) relevant industry knowledge, (2) great 
insight into the firm’s activities, (3) is excellent at finding and engaging relevant board 
members, (4) has trustful leadership style. In such firms, the board chair is also usually (5) 
good at motivating board members, (6) is prepared for board meeting. Board members in 
more innovative spin-offs tend to be actively involved in the long-term strategies and overall 
goals. 
 
5.3 Board’s value-adding role 
In the case-based study (article 1), it was shown that new outside directors can bring critical 
resources that the top management team lacks (Bjørnåli & Gulbrandsen 2010). They may thus 
be considered to play a value-adding role. In each development stage the management team 
works on certain tasks and acquires necessary additional resources through new board 
members. The board members added in the first rounds are mostly investors and industry 
representatives helping to solve tasks related to securing financing and strategic positioning. 
The board members added in later rounds are investors, professional executives and those 
with market-specific knowledge aiding with the acquisition of other resources, organization 
and administration, and sales and marketing. 
 
New outside directors were mainly selected from the network of the professional board chair. 
This chair came from outside the venture during the first board change and tended to remain 
in the company during all stages of growth influencing subsequent board additions. In less 
than half of the cases the chair represented the largest external stakeholder: venture capitalist 
or industry partner. In other cases the chair did not represent any major stakeholder, and thus 
contributed to the firm by finding new board members through his or her personal networks 
without having any influence as the largest external stakeholders might have.  
 
To sum up, successful academic spin-offs have boards with qualities that complement the 
tasks spin-offs have to solve: in terms of providing access to or bringing relevant resources 
that top management team lacks. Board chair’s social networks are important when it comes 
to finding new board members.  
 
5.4 Networking and active boards 
The founders of our case study spin-offs emphasized that recruitment to the management team 
was as an important, even a critical activity, in their ventures. Therefore, in article 2, we have 
explored the role that the board of directors plays in the process of recruitment of new team 
members (Bjørnåli and Erikson 2010). We found that board size and the level of networking 
activity facilitate the addition of team members. That is, academic spin-off companies which 
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have larger, more active networking boards are more likely to add new members to their 
management teams.  
 
According to the supplemental correlation analysis carried out for the purposes of this report, 
these more active networking boards are those boards where board chairs have the following 
qualities, the chair: (1) has long experience on the board, (2) has relevant industry knowledge, 
(3) is engaging and motivates new board members, (4) has an open leadership style and, (5) 
finds time for board duties. Board chairs with these many, apparently positive, qualities tend 
to be found in firms where board members are active with regard to board-related activities, in 
that: (a) they function as mentors for the CEO and the firm, (b) they are involved in the firm’s 
long-term strategy and overall goals, (c) they have enough time to attend to board tasks and, 
(d) they are always well prepared for board meetings. These results seem to indicate that a 
board chair with many “positive” qualities manages to find board members who are active 
and also who are diverse in terms of their functional, industrial and educational backgrounds, 
as well as their international experience, personalities and ages. In summary it seems that 
networking boards are typically diverse in their backgrounds, active in implementing board 
tasks and have an active and professional board chair. Furthermore, firms that have a 
professional board chair, with many positive qualities, are more likely to be more innovative 
when it comes to the form of their new products/services. 
 
In firms with networking and active boards, that are fulfilling board duties we usually find 
that: (a) the CEO and chair work well together, the relationship between them is fairly 
informal and they are confident in each other; (b) management team members have diverse 
prior start-up and managerial experience; and, (c) team performance is improved. 
     
In firms that develop a product which is similar to existing products in the market, boards do 
not tend to increase firm’s legitimacy, and firms to a little extent tend to utilize board 
member’s networks to get advice.  
 
In summary, successful academic spin-offs have boards who actively engage in network 
building, consistent strategic activities and other board duties. Board chair is active and 
enthusiastic and have a good working relationship with the CEO. There is diversity among 
board and team members’ backgrounds and experiences.  
 
5.5 Board, team and financing 
The results of the article 3 show that the likelihood of attracting venture capital is increased if 
the spin-off firms were previously financed by seed and industrial capital (Bjørnåli et al. 
2010).  After the incubator period and until the academic spin-off may apply for more grants 
(e.g. R&D grant “IFU/OFU”) from the Innovation Norway, there is a gap. This gap may be 
filled by seed capital, which is usually used to verify technology and map market 
opportunities and firm’s competitive advantages. There are a number of nationwide and 
regional public-private seed capital funds. Some of them are supported by Innovation 
Norway. Recent evaluations of Norwegian seed capital funds show that seed capital funds 
should be larger if they are to fill the existing gap in demand for financial support (Grünfeld et 
al. 2009). According to Grünfeld et al. (2009), the majority of Norwegian TTOs assert that 
current seed funds make investments in academic spin-offs too late and take too little risk. 
 
Under an industrial R&D scheme (i.e. “IFU” grant) an academic spin-off and a large 
industrial actor have to collaborate on new product development. One of the aims of the 
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scheme is the joint development of internationally competitive products by academic spin-offs 
with domestic and international industrial partners (customers). Whether a spin-off is 
supported by Innovation Norway through a public or industrial R&D grant or not, a venture 
may seek additional venture capital financing to nurture the company’s growth. Venture 
capital firms usually invest in companies in the growth phase with considerable market-
related risk. As our results show, the probability of receiving venture capital is higher if the 
spin-off has previously managed to attract seed capital or financing from industrial partners.  
To reiterate the relevant finding here, only 24% of the firms in the sample reported that they 
have received seed financing, while14% had tried but failed to receive seed financing (see 
Table 4.4) and about one-third had been financed by industrial investors. Along with finance, 
venture capital investors can also provide resources related to strategic and service activities, 
giving advice and acting as “a door-opener” for an academic spin-off (Berg-Utby 2007).  
 
The additional correlation analysis demonstrates that in seed financed firms the board chairs 
tend to: (1) have long-term board experience in other companies, (2) have an open leadership 
style and (3) find time to develop board’s working processes and for board meetings. The 
only characteristic of board chairs which is significantly more common in venture capital 
financed firms is that they have long-term board experience from other companies.  
 
As shown in article 3 (Bjørnåli et al. 2010), diversity in the functional and industrial 
backgrounds of management team members is the next most important characteristic (after 
seed and industry financing) that venture capital investors pay attention to. Venture capital 
investors either select teams who have members with this kind of diversity or appoint new 
members to the management team to achieve this diversity. 
 
The findings correspond to our results from the case studies; when academic founders (with 
or without venture capital financing) were asked what they learned from their first start-up, 
they reported they “would put more emphasis on the team” and that one of the resources they 
needed most while getting established was industry experience and owners with relevant 
competences and networks, “not only money”.  
 
5.6 Team and board membership changes 
The results in article 2 suggest that the larger the board and the better the growth, the more 
likely it is a new team member will be recruited (Bjørnåli and Erikson 2010). Although it is 
not significant, our third firm performance variable, which measures the satisfaction with firm 
performance regarding market share, profit, sales and return on assets, is positively related to 
subsequent team member addition. Most of the survey respondents are CEOs and original 
founders in CEO, board chair and other positions. Thus, this positive relationship may 
indicate that when the CEO/founder is satisfied with firm performance he or she will most 
probably have a positive attitude toward the recruitment of new management team members. 
These results partly correspond to previous technology-based firm studies, which have 
demonstrated the U-shaped relationship between management team change and firm growth 
(Boeker and Karichalil, 2002; Boeker and Wiltbank, 2005). Both fast growth and a lack of 
start-up growth create the need for different top managers, but in the latter case “to help turn 
the new venture around” (Boeker and Wiltbank, 2005: 125). 
 
In case-based article 1, we explored board formation and changes in board membership in 
academic spin-off companies in Norway and the US (Bjørnåli and Gulbrandsen 2010). At the 
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point of a spin-off being founded, the boards typically consisted of the scientist-entrepreneurs 
and people from the scientist-entrepreneurs’ networks. Boards then underwent changes as the 
academic spin-offs grew. These changes were closely related to overcoming critical junctures 
and reaching the next development stage. In particular, the first change in board composition 
was positively related to the spin-off gaining credibility and moving to the Proof-of-Viability 
stage (see Fig. 2.1), while subsequent changes typically moved the academic spin-off closer to 
the subsequent, Maturity stage. These findings indicate that the additions of key board 
members are positively associated with the progress of a spin-off, in terms of moving it on 
from one stage to the next. 
 
Due to few answers being provided regarding departures from the team and board in 
academic spin-offs, we are not able to make any robust statistical analyses of these changes. 
The consequences of departures appear to be mixed. Some departures are positive for the 
firms’ strategy, leading to more focus on certain business areas; most departures of the CEO 
or management team members seem to be negative for firm performance, as they mean loss of 
needed competence. In light of this, departures from the team and board, the drivers of 
departures and their consequences for the team/board and firm performance remain an area 
for future research.  
 
 
6 Implications 
When forming a team, TTOs and entrepreneurs should pay attention to the task-related 
diversity in terms of functional and industrial backgrounds of the team members. This 
diversity is shown to be positively related to the academic spin-off’s ability to recruit new 
management team members and attract venture capital financing (Bjørnåli and Erikson 2010; 
Bjørnåli et al. 2010). This is in line with previous research which demonstrates that early 
stage technology-based firms overcome various thresholds (e.g. receiving VC funding, going 
public) when they have teams that are complete in terms of the functions of marketing, 
finance, operations, and engineering (Roure and Maidique 1986; Zimmerman 2008; Beckman 
et al. 2007) and heterogeneous in industry experience (Chandler et al. 2005). For practitioners 
seeking further firm development, this implies that they should adjust the team’s functional 
and industrial diversity by adding members with relevant expertise to the management team in 
order to enable growth and overcome the thresholds that an academic spin-off faces. 
 
Although, the task-related diversity is important, yet, the results demonstrate that prior seed 
and industry financing appear to be the more important predictors of receiving venture capital 
financing than a management team’s task-related diversity (Bjørnåli et al. 2010). This may 
imply that the management team’s ability to accumulate seed and industrial financing prior to 
seeking venture capital plays a greater role than the team’s background diversity per se. The 
findings suggest that previous seed funding and alliances with industrial partners are 
positively related to an academic spin-off’s ability to attract venture capital. For policy 
makers, this means that they could stimulate seed capital funds to make investments in more 
academic spin-offs. Further, the industrial support schemes could be designed to facilitate 
greater involvement of strategic industrial partners in academic spin-offs.  
 
Next, the findings point to that the board member additions may be seen as an effect of spin-
off’s progress to a new stage, but more as a driving force in the academic spin-off 
development (Bjørnåli and Gulbrandsen 2010). An important policy message is therefore to 
include the perspective of board dynamics in mechanisms intended to support academic spin-
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off development. For instance, certain types of public funding seeking to stimulate academic 
entrepreneurship could be made contingent on the ability to attract professional outside 
directors to the board of an academic spin-off. 
 
Compared to well-established US TTOs whose involvement was basically limited to 
developing patenting and licensing agreements, we found that young TTOs in Norway played 
a much more active role in ASOs (ibid.). They were represented on the spin-off board and in 
some cases the management team, picking new board members and participating in other 
strategic decisions. Despite this active involvement during the legal incorporation and early 
post-startup period, the Norwegian spin-offs seemed to have a slower rate of development in 
post-startup stages. The active participation of Norwegian TTOs in academic spin-offs may be 
explained by their goal, which is to secure a future income for themselves and their 
universities. Also, as TTOs are newly established it is important for them to demonstrate their 
legitimacy and importance in aiding technology transfer and spawning new firms – following 
recent legislative changes that some academics still do not welcome. There may thus be a 
conflict of interest for the TTO staff as representatives of the university (Mosey and Wright 
2007), since involving outsiders may reduce their role and potential income. Public academic 
spin-off support programs and seed capital funds, which exist in Norway and most other 
countries interested in stimulating academic entrepreneurship, should be aware of this and 
moderate the financial expectations to TTOs.  
 
Until recently, the legal establishment of a spin-off company was regarded as a significant 
event for Norwegian TTOs, and they received extra funding for this (Bjørnåli and 
Gulbrandsen 2010). The pitfall here is therefore also related to premature formal 
establishment of an academic spin-off before all necessary resources have been acquired and 
developed. Public support mechanisms should be tailored so that they could prevent the 
premature formal spin-off establishment. As shown in the case data, after such early legal 
start-up some scientist-entrepreneurs were frustrated by a lack of progress. So, attracting the 
first key outside directors who were also the main resource providers was experienced as an 
“actual” start-up enabling the academic spin-off to develop the business further. The 
challenge for TTOs is, in other words, to find a balance between acting as a representative of 
the university and as a wider societal institution (ibid.). 
 
To policy-makers and practitioners, we suggest that there may be a need to develop policies 
that support academic spin-offs in finding outside directors. Efforts to develop networks and 
relationships with professional board members – investors, industrial members, and 
executives – may be an important additional component in general and specific assistance 
programs. This may imply that TTOs should recruit staff and/or develop relationships with 
people who have long-term board experience and relevant industry experience. Such people 
would be able to provide greater insights into spin-off firms’ activities, a task which is quite 
challenging considering that most academic spin-offs develop unique or completely new 
technology/products and aim at industry niches or even new markets. Academic spin-offs 
therefore require highly skilled outside directors, with unique, relevant expertise, who have 
good networks and access to complementary resources. Such skills may help address the 
concerns that academic spin-offs are being created without the necessary resources to develop 
the business further.  
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7 Conclusions 
This report has sought to investigate the role of top management teams and boards of directors 
in academic spin-off companies. The findings show that boards in successful academic spin-
offs add value by bringing in necessary resources that the management team lacks. In growing 
firms boards are also important in networking and in fulfilling strategic tasks and other duties. 
Larger and more active networking boards facilitate the recruitment of new people to the 
management team. Additions of new CEOs and management team members usually have a 
positive impact on firm performance. Firms with networking boards are characterized by 
more effective teams. Additions to the board are associated with the progress of an academic 
spin-off, such as in moving from one development stage to the next. The board chair’s 
personal networks are important for finding new potential board members. In most innovative 
firms the board chair is active and has a good working relationship with the CEO.  Effective 
management teams have diverse functional and industrial backgrounds and are better able to 
attract new team members and secure venture capital financing than less diverse teams. 
Previous seed and industry financing increase the probability of attracting venture capital. 
 
We recommend that policy makers develop policies that meet the needs of academic spin-offs 
in terms of finding professional, outside directors. Efforts to develop networks and 
relationships with potential board members – investors, industrial partners, executives – 
would address the concerns that academic spin-offs start up without the necessary resources to 
move the business forward. We also recommend that seed funds be stimulated to make more 
investments in academic spin-offs, and that more industrial schemes could be designed to 
stimulate greater involvement of industrial actors in academic spin-offs.  
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Appendix  
Table 1 Cases overview*   
*from the study by Bjørnåli and Gulbrandsen (2010), Journal of Technology Transfer, 35 (1), 92-112  
Academic spin-offs Norway Academic spin-offs US   Firm and 
Board 
characteristics 
Biomedical  Nutriment Optical Chemical Software Biotech 2 SemiCon   
1 
SemiCon 2 Biotech 
1 
SemiCon 
3 
SemiCon 4 
Establishment 
year 
 
1998 1999 2001 2001 2004 1998 2000 2001 2003 2004 2004 
 
Parent 
organization 
 
The Norwegian 
Forest and 
Landskape 
Institute 
The Foundation 
for Scientific 
and Industrial 
Research 
Norwegian 
Defence 
Research 
Establishment 
Norwegian 
University of 
Life Sciences 
Norwegian 
University of 
Science and 
Technology 
Stanford 
university 
Stanford 
university 
University of 
Michigan 
UC 
Berkeley 
UC 
Berkeley 
University 
of 
Michigan 
Number of 
full-time 
employees in  
2007 
 
15 
 
7 Norway, 16 
abroad 
 
5 
 
0 
 
3 
 
10 
 
25 
 
25 
 
69 
 
25 
 
20 
Degree of 
innovation 
 
New technology (drug, medicine), patented internationally Not patented New technology (drug, medicine), patented internationally 
 
Stage of 
development 
 
Maturity 
 
Proof of 
viability 
 
Proof of 
viability 
 
Proof of 
viability 
 
Proof of 
viability 
 
Maturity 
In 
transition 
to 
Maturity 
 
Maturity 
 
Maturity 
In 
transition 
to 
Maturity 
 
In 
transition 
to Maturity 
Founding 
team size  
 
3 3 4 5 7 3 2 3 3 4 4 
Positions of 
academic 
inventors held 
in the 
company 
(current and 
previous) 
Product 
development 
dir., R&D dir., 
CEO, board 
members  
Short period 
CEO, board 
chairman, 
board 
members 
CEO, CTO, 
board 
chairman, 
board 
members 
Board 
chairman, 
board 
members 
VP 
technology 
development, 
VP R&D, 
board members 
CEO, 
board 
members 
CTO, 
President 
CTO, Chief 
Science 
Officer,  R&D 
Director, board 
member 
VPs 
R&D, 
Presiden
t, board 
members 
President 
and CTO, 
founder / 
board 
member 
CTO, 
board 
member 
Board size  
in 2007 
6 7 4 4 4 8 9 7 8 7 6 
Number of 
board 
membership 
changes 
6 6 4 2 2 8 7 7 6 3 3 
Questionnaire  
 
Selected questions (in original language) 
 
Del A. Om bedriften 
 
 
 
A4 Hvor mange årsverk arbeider i bedriften:  
   2004   2005 2006 2007 2008 Estimat for 2009 
  Antall årsverk          
 
 
 
 
A10a 
 
Siden oppstart hvordan er bedriftens: 
 
Mye 
dårligere  
Mye
bedre
 •  vekst i salg 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 •  vekst i markedsandel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 •  kvalitet i produkter/tjenester 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 •  innovasjon i produkter/tjenester 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 •  kundetilfredshet 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 •  lønnsomhet 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 •  finansiering 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
A10b 
 
Vår bedrift er fornøyd med: 
 
Helt  
uenig  
Helt 
enig
A2a Hvilken forskningsenhet (universitet) kommer teknologi/gründere fra? 
 
……………………….. 
A2b Hvilken kommersialiseringsaktør / Technology Transfer Office har 
bedriften benyttet seg av? 
 
………………………… 
A3 Hvilke aktiviteter beskriver bedriften best? 
 1 Olje og gass 2 IKT 
 3 Medtek / biomedisin 4 Bioteknologi / næringsmidler 
 5 Marin / akvakultur 6 Maritim / offshore 
 7 IKT / Helse 8 Energi/miljø 
 9 Annet, vennligst spesifiser………………………  
A5 Har bedriften vært lokalisert i:      
      1 Inkubator      2 Forsknings- eller kunnskapspark     3 Næringshage    4 Ingen av disse 
A6a Hvordan vil du karakterisere nyskapingsgraden på produkt, teknologi og marked? (kryss av i alle 
boksene som passer) 
          1 Produktet eller tjenesten er helt nytt i markedet 
         2 Teknologien er helt ny i markedet 
         3 Markedet for produktet/tjenesten eller teknologien er helt nytt 
         4 Tilsvarende produkt/tjeneste, teknologi, marked eksisterer 
 
A6b Hvis det er et helt nytt produkt eller tjeneste; er det tale om nytt i:  1 Norge      2 Internasjonalt   
A7 I hvilket stadium av livssyklusen befinner selskapet seg? (sett kun ett kryss) 
 
         0 Tidlig fasen: Vi jobber med å vurdere kommersiell potensial og styrke intellektuelle rettighetter, vi  
              søker om patent eller prøver å beskytte teknologien som skal ligge til grunn i produktet/tjenesten. 
         1 Utviklingsfasen: I denne fasen utvikles produktet/tjenesten og er kun i begrenset grad  
              introdusert på markedet. Omsetningen er lav. 
         2 Etablerings-/introduksjonsfasen: Selskapets produkt/tjeneste blir gradvis mer introdusert på 
              markedet.  
         3 Vekstfasen: Selskapet vokser sterkt og investeringer kan være nødvendig for videre utvikling.  
              Selskapets produkt/tjeneste kan være introdusert på flere markeder, og omsetningen øker.  
         4 Modningsfasen: Omsetningen flater ut, og selskapet har nådd de kunder som kan forventes å  
              være aktuelle innenfor dagens satsningsområder.  
  
  •  markedsandel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 •  resultat 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 •  salg 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 •  kapitalrentabilitet 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Del B. Om ledelse 
 
 
 
B3 Hvor mange personer inngår i lederteamet (ikke inkludert styret)? 
 
Antall: ______ 
 
B8a  Hvilke og hvor mange personer består lederteamet av og hvor mange årsverk utgjør de i  
        bedriften: 
  Antall personer Ca. årsverk 
 • akademikere, professorer, forskere, PhD studenter      
 • studenter som tar eller har tatt studier på masternivå ol.   
 • medlemmer med tilknytning til TTO, inkubator ol.   
 • medlemmer uten tilknytning til forskningsinstitutt / universitet   
 
 
 
B12a Hvilken rolle / stilling hadde vedkommende som forlot lederteamet eller styret i bedriften? 
 
 ...................  
B12b Hvilken rolle / stilling har den nye personen fått i bedriften? 
 
 ...................  
 
 
   B13      Hva var årsaken til at det har blitt utskiftning i  lederteamet eller styret? 
 
  Ranger årsaker til at vedkommende forlot ledelsen (1 – største årsak osv.) Rang 1 til 5  
  • Vedkommende kom i konflikt med andre     
  • Vedkommende tok gale strategiske beslutninger    
  • Vedkommende ønsket seg en annen jobb / hadde ikke tid    
  • Hovedeier(e) ønsket at vedkommende forlot ledelsen    
  • Andre årsaker, vennligst spesifiser …………………..    
   
B1 Hvor lenge har lederen arbeidet i bedriften? 
 
Antall år:_____ 
B2 Er bedriftens leder også:      1 Styreleder      2 Styremedlem     3 Ingen av disse 
 
B4 Hvor mange personer består styret av? 
 
Antall: ______ 
B7 Hvis den opprinnelige grunnleggeren fremdeles er involvert i bedriften hvor stor stillingsprosent 
har vedkommende nå i bedriften, og hvilken posisjon har vedkommende? ……………………… 
 
 
B9 Hvor mange personer i lederteamet har tidligere jobbet innenfor samme 
bedrift (ikke nødvendigvis i samme periode). Velg maksimal tall, f. eks. hvis 3 
ledere tidligere jobbet i Sintef og 2 andre ledere jobbet i Microsoft, skriv 3.  
Antall personer:  
 
………… 
B10 Hvor mange utskiftninger i lederteamet har det vært siden bedriften ble etablert? ……. 
 
Tenk nå på den viktigste / kritiske utskiftningen i lederteamet (eller styret hvis det ikke har vært 
utskiftninger i lederteamet): 
B11 Handler det om: (Vennligst kryss av i alle boksene som passer) 
  1 en person som forlot lederteamet                        Årstall:………………….. 
 2 en ny person som har blitt ansatt i lederteamet   Årstall:………………….. 
 
 Ranger årsaker til at vedkommende ble ansatt i ledelsen (1 – største årsak osv.) 
  • Vi ønsket oss den kompetansen vedkommende hadde    
  • Vedkommende skulle erstatte personen som forlot bedriften    
  • Bedriften vokste og vi trengte en som kunne lede nye avdelinger    
  • Hovedeier(e) ønsket at vedkommende ble med i ledelsen    
  • Andre årsaker, vennligst spesifiser ………………………    
         
 
B14  Hvilke positive og/eller negative konsekvenser innebar personbyttet i ledelsen for bedriftens  
       vekst / ytelse?  
 
  i tilfelle hvor vedkommende forlot ledelsen ……........ 
           
  i tilfelle hvor vedkommende ble ansatt i ledelsen…………… 
           
 
 
B18a   Teammedlemmene representerer meget stor bredde  
         mht: 
I svært  
liten grad  
I svært 
stor grad
  • Funksjonell bakgrunn (f. eks. salg, finans osv.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  • Industriell bakgrunn  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  • Utdanningsbakgrunn  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  • Personlighet  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  • Alder 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  • Erfaring fra nyetableringer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  • Ledererfaring  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  • Internasjonal erfaring (jobbet i utlandet, er utenlandsk) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Del C. Om finansiering 
 
C1 Har bedriften kontaktet og eventuelt mottatt ekstern 
finansiering fra noen av de følgende aktørene?  
Nei, har ikke 
forsøkt 
Har forsøkt, men 
ikke mottatt kapital 
Har mottatt 
kapital 
  • Familie 1   2   3 
  • Såkornfond 1   2   3 
  • Inkubatorstipend 1   2   3 
  • IFU / OFU støtte 1   2   3 
  • Øvrig støtte fra Forskningsrådet 1   2   3 
  • Annet, spesifiser………………….. 1   2   3 
 
B15   Hvis en ny person har blitt ansatt i lederteamet, hvordan ble denne personen funnet?  
        Gjennom: 
 
        1 Etablereren av denne bedriften 2 Hovedeier 
        3 Daglig leder   4 Styreformann 
        5 TTO / kommersialiseringsenhet 6 Investors kontakter 
        7 Profesjonelle nettverk 8  Rekrutteringsfirma, konsulenter osv. 
        9  Annet, vennligst spesifiser………………..  
B17   Hva tilførte den personen som ble med i lederteamet ved viktigste / kritiske utskiftning? 
 
 1   Erfaring fra markedsføring og salg 2 Internasjonal erfaring 
 3  Kunnskap om markedet, industri, bransjen 4 Erfaring fra administrasjon og ledelse 
 5  Nødvendige kontakter 6 Annet, spesifiser…………….. 
C2 Når ble det første gang hentet inn ekstern egenkapital fra private 
investorer (ikke familie)? 
Årstall: ……….  2 Aldri 
C3 Når ble det første gang innhentet kapital fra industrielle partnere? 
 
Årstall: ……….  2 Aldri 
  
 
 
 
 
Del D. Om styret  
 
D1 Styreleder er også (kryss av i alle boksene som passer) 
 
            1 Daglig leder     2 Grunnleggeren av bedriften    3  Representerer hovedeiere    4 Ingen av disse 
 
 
D2 
 
Hvor lenge har styreleder vært i bedriften? 
 
 
Ca _____ år 
D3a Hvor mange styreverv innehar styreleder i andre selskap per i dag? 
 
 
Ca _____ styreverv 
 
D4      Vår styreleder  Helt  
uenig nøytral 
Helt 
enig
 •  har lang styrearbeidserfaring fra andre selskap 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 •  har relevant industri- / bransjeerfaring (i forhold til 
selskapets virksomhet 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 •  har god innsikt i selskapet (hovedaktiviteter, produkter)  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 •  er fremragende til å finne og engasjere nye styre-
medlemmer med relevant kompetanse / kunnskap / nettverk 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 •  er fremragende til å motivere og benytte kompetansen til 
hvert enkelt styremedlem 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 •  har en åpen og tillitsfull lederstil 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 •  arbeider hele tiden for å utvikle styrets arbeidsformer og 
prosesser, og er veldig godt forberedt til styremøtene 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
D5   I hvilken grad er du enig med følgende påstander om  
      styrets bidrag? 
I svært liten 
grad  
I svært stor 
grad
 • Styremedlemmene bidrar til nettverksbygging 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 • Styremedlemmene bidrar til lobbyvirksomhet og legitimering 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 • Bedriften og styret benytter seg ofte av styremedlemmenes 
nettverk for å få råd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 • Styret og styremedlemmene fungerer som mentorer for 
daglig leder og bedriften 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 • Styret er aktivt involvert i arbeidet knyttet til langsiktige 
strategier og overordnede mål 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
C4 Når ble det første gang innhentet kapital fra et venture kapital foretak? 
 
Årstall:………… 2 Aldri
C5 Hvor mange ganger ble det innhentet kapital fra en venture kapital 
investor? 
 
Antall ganger: 
                      ……… 
Tenk nå på den siste viktigste / største investeringen: 
C6    Hvem av de følgende investorer var det (ett kryss): 
 1  Privat investor / såkornfond 2 Industriell partner 
 3  Venture kapitalist 4 Andre, spesifiser…………………………… 
C9     Hvilken av følgende personer i bedriften hadde relasjoner til denne investoren fra tidligere? 
 
 1  Daglig leder  2 Medlem av vårt lederteam 
 3  Styreformann 4 Ekstern styremedlem 
 5  TTO / kommersialiseringsaktør 6 Ingen av disse 
C12    Vennligst, ranger eierne i bedriften: 1 – største eier, 2 – nest største eier osv.: 
 
__  Daglig leder  __ Opprinnelige grunnleggere 
__  Venture kapital investorer __ Øvrige investorer 
__  Industrielle partnere __ TTO, kommersialiseringsenhet 
__  Ansatte __ Andre eksterne eiere 
  • Styremedlemmene prioriterer nok tid til sitt styreoppdrag i 
selskapet og er alltid veldig godt forberedt til styremøtene 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
D6   Styremedlemmer representerer meget stor bredde mht 
 
Helt  
uenig nøytral 
Helt 
enig
  •  Funksjonell bakgrunn (f. eks. salg, finans) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  •  Industriell bakgrunn (f. eks. ulike bransjer) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  •  Utdanningsbakgrunn  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  •  Personlighet (f. eks.ulike grad av kreativitet) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  •  Alder 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  •  Internasjonal erfaring 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
D9 Hvis daglig leder og styreleder ikke er den samme 
person, hvor enig / uenig er du i følgende påstander:  
 
Helt  
uenig 
 Helt 
enig
 •  Vår styreleder arbeider veldig godt med daglig leder 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 •  Begge parter er villige til å tilpasse den løpende relasjonen 
med henblikk på å imøtekomme endrede betingelser 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 •  Utveksling av informasjon forekommer ofte og uformelt og 
ikke kun ut fra forutgående avtaler 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 •  Det forventes at vi holder hverandre informert om 
begivenheter eller endringer som kan påvirke den andre part 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 •  Problem som oppstår i denne relasjonen behandles av 
begge parter som et felles ansvar snarere enn et individuelt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 •  Vi ser ofte forskjellig på innholdet i beslutninger 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 •  Ofte har vi forskjellige meninger 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
D8    Hvor mange styremedlemmer har følgende bakgrunn:   __ Venture kapital investorer 
 
 __ TTO / kommersialiseringsaktørs representanter  __ Eksterne medlemmer (ikke ansatte) 
